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INTRODUCTION TO THE DISSERTATION  
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1 BACKGROUND 
Venture capital (VC) firms specialize in providing financing to small, high-potential 
ventures with the goal of profiting from their growth (Sahlman, 1990; Wright & Robbie, 
1998). They function as intermediaries, raising funds mainly from pension funds and 
other institutional investors and channeling them to their investment targets (Amit, 
Brander, & Zott, 1998; Ueda, 2004; Winton, 2003). An essential feature of venture 
capital financing is that it is commonly considered to be about more than just the money 
(Black & Gilson, 1998). In addition to carefully selecting their investment targets, VC 
firms typically actively monitor and manage their investments in order to increase their 
value (De Clercq, Sapienza, & Zaheer, 2008b; Macmillan, Kulow, & Khoylian, 1989; 
Sapienza, Manigart, & Vermier, 1996; Zider, 1998). In selecting and managing 
investments, VC firms co-operate to such a degree that it is rare for a successful venture 
capital-financed venture to be financed only by one venture capitalist. In contrast, the 
majority of VC investments are backed by an investor group, i.e., a syndicate.  
The high frequency of co-operation is motivated and conditioned by the benefits and 
effects it produces on the levels of investments, VC firms, and networks. On the level of 
investments, syndication combines the resources and expertise of multiple investors to 
enhance the accuracy of investment decisions and the quality of assistance (Brander, 
Amit, & Antweiler, 2002; Manigart et al., 2006). The members of syndicates contribute 
their financial resources, expertise, social capital, and reputation to the development of 
syndicated ventures. Accordingly, research has found that ventures backed by a 
syndicate produce higher returns on investment and reach successful exits faster and 
with a higher probability than non-syndicated ventures (Brander et al., 2002; Cumming 
& Walz, 2004; De Clercq & Dimov, 2008a; Giot & Schwienbacher, 2007; Hege, 
Palomino, & Schwienbacher, 2008).  
While on the venture level the co-operation of investors offers an opportunity to pool 
resources, on the level of the VC firm syndication offers a means to manage business 
and investment risks, to leverage resources, and enhance the quality of decision making 
(Bygrave, 1987; Lerner, 1994; Lockett & Wright, 2001; Manigart et al., 2006). In 
particular, the opportunity to use syndication in a contingent manner to leverage and 
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compensate the resources and opportunities of a VC firm implies that VC financing is 
also about more than the money for the VC firms themselves. In order to succeed in 
securing further funds from institutional investors, VC firms have to outperform their 
competitors. Within this competition for funds, VC firms use syndication as one 
available mechanism to both increase their performance and reduce the risks of 
underperformance (De Clercq et al., 2008a; Jääskeläinen, Maula, & Seppä, 2006; 
Lerner, 1994; Lockett et al., 2001). Therefore, in addition to using syndication to 
enhance investment performance, VC firms use syndication to enhance their own 
performance and chances of survival. 
In addition to the venture- and VC firm-level motives and effects, a syndicated 
investment creates a relationship between the VC firms participating in the syndicate. 
The multiple connections between VC firms through syndicates accumulate into 
patterns of inter-organizational ties, often described as syndication networks. These 
network connections of VC firms both transmit information and reflect inter-
organizational hierarchies among VC firms (Podolny, 2001). Therefore, both the 
immediate partners of a VC firm and the firm’s positioning in the network affect the 
opportunities and performance of VC firms, as well as their investment targets (Echols 
& Tsai, 2005; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007).  
The positioning of this dissertation within the field of venture capital syndication can be 
described by using these three main levels of analysis in syndication research: 
investments, VC firms, and networks. As the multiple motives, effects, and levels of 
interests suggest, syndication has attracted a considerable amount of research interest. 
Despite the attention devoted to the topic, this research effort has been unevenly 
distributed among the approaches and levels of interest related to venture capital 
syndication. As suggested by the first paper of the dissertation (Appendix 1), reviewing 
the existing literature, the research has been dominated by a focus on the decision to 
syndicate and the effects of syndication on the level of an individual investment target. 
Adopting perspectives that have received less attention, the three remaining studies 
focus on specific issues related to syndication. The second paper (Appendix 2) 
introduces a new perspective on investment-level aspects of syndication by considering 
syndication and profit distribution in policy-oriented VC funds. The third paper 
5 
 
(Appendix 3) addresses the VC firm-level effects of syndication, addressing the little-
researched interaction of VC resources and syndication by investigating the effects of 
work-sharing on the optimal portfolio size of VC firms. The last paper (Appendix 4) 
adopts a network-level approach, focusing on the effects of the emergent syndication 
network on the distribution of information.  
This introduction to the dissertation briefly reviews the specific questions addressed by 
the individual studies, considers their mutual relations, and highlights the key 
contributions of the dissertation to research, policy, and practice. As each of the studies 
contains topic-specific discussions on theoretical approaches, methodologies, results, 
and limitations, I here present the common approaches and contributions that are 
present in each of the studies and emerge when the studies are considered together. The 
remainder of this introduction proceeds by first presenting the research question, then 
addressing the contributions and limitations, and finally concluding with suggestions for 
future research. 
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2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research interest that combines the four papers of the dissertation is the objective of 
contributing to the literature on venture capital syndication by providing perspectives 
that extend the current literature. For this purpose, I present two types of research 
questions. First, to identify opportunities for contributions, I ask what we know and still 
need to learn about venture capital syndication. Second, to address selected areas for 
further contributions, I present three specific research questions. 
Whereas the first paper, providing a review of the literature, addresses syndication on 
all of its levels, the following three papers address specific topics on each of the levels 
of syndication. First, on the investment level, I ask how effective profit distribution 
structures are as policy instruments in the syndicated fund investments of public and 
private investors. Second, on the VC firm level, I ask how the syndication of 
investments affects the optimal portfolio size. Finally, on the syndication network level, 
I ask how the network of connections between VCs facilitates the distribution of 
information about investments.  
Research Question 1: What Do We Know about Venture Capital Syndication? 
The first research question is motivated by the need to create an understanding of the 
extant literature on venture capital syndication. Rather than presenting questions about 
any specific aspect of syndication, the question asks what is known about VC 
syndication. Specifically, the paper aims to assess how well the current knowledge is 
able to answer the questions of how, why, and under what circumstances syndication 
affects the performance of ventures and VC firms. While there exist a few reviews 
focusing on a specific topic of syndication, such as contracting (Tykvova, 2007), 
motivation (e.g.  Lockett et al., 2001; Manigart et al., 2006), and the strategic 
approaches of VC firms (De Clercq & Dimov, Forthcoming), the answers to the 
questions of how, why, and when are dispersed among individual contributions. Thus, 
the objective of the paper is to review, synthesize, and assess the literature for the 
purpose of identifying gaps within the current knowledge and to suggest areas for 
further research.  
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Research Question 2: How Effective Are Profit Distribution Structures in Funds 
Syndicated by Private and Public Actors? 
The second paper addresses syndication on the investment level, examining profit 
distribution structures in hybrid funds with syndicated investments from both private 
and public sector actors. The paper addresses the policy interest of creating privately 
managed funds in areas where private market actors are not willing to invest because of 
the low expected returns (Gilson, 2003). The paper seeks to answer the research 
question of what the limits are for the existing fund structures with respect to their 
ability to affect the profit distribution of hybrid funds. The question is motivated by the 
policy-makers’ increasing concern about the lack of risk capital available to new and 
early-stage entrepreneurial ventures. This has led several governments to set up 
programs to channel finance to young enterprises through private venture capital funds. 
Research Question 3: Does Syndication Increase the Optimal Portfolio Size of 
VCs? 
The third paper addresses the effects of syndication on the VC firm level. The specific 
research question is how venture capitalist involvement in portfolio firms is related to 
the performance of the VC firm. This implies two subquestions. First, the paper asks 
whether there is an optimal average level of attention to be allocated to portfolio 
ventures; that is, is the performance of the VC firm related to the number of ventures it 
manages? The second subquestion asks how, if there is an optimal allocation, it is 
affected by the use of syndication, especially relative to the syndicate role of the VC 
firm. Should syndication provide a mechanism for work-sharing among syndicate 
members, then the use of syndication reduces the average workload per syndicate 
member. Therefore, the more a VC firm syndicates, especially as a non-lead investor, 
the greater the optimal size of the portfolio. These questions are motivated by gaps in 
the research on the value of VC involvement in ventures, and on the effects of 
syndication on the internal operations of VC firms. In both these areas of the literature, 
research has established that involvement (e.g. Sapienza, 1992) and syndication (e.g. 
Brander et al., 2002) have positive effects on ventures, but whether and how these 
translate to the enhanced performance of the VC firm has received less attention.  
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Research Question 4: How do Syndication Networks Help Mediate Information on 
Investment Targets? 
The fourth paper addresses the effects of syndication networks. The purpose of the 
paper is to examine how networks of financial intermediaries affect the distribution of 
information among the network members and across distances. Specifically, the paper 
answers the question of how the networks of VC firms affect the distribution of 
information on their investment targets to new investors. On the one hand, the 
motivation for the question stems from the theoretical literature that focuses on the 
question of why investors tend to prefer local investment targets (Coval & Moskowitz, 
1999; Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2001). On the other hand, from the policy perspective the 
motivation comes from the need to understand the factors that facilitate exits to non-
domestic markets. These opportunities facilitate the functioning of venture capital 
markets, as the possibility of finding exit routes is crucial for the initial investment 
decisions (Black et al., 1998).   
Figure 1 explicates the relationships between the research questions and the targeted 
levels of analysis. The first paper addresses syndication as a whole, covering all the 
levels within its review of the literature. The second paper addresses the topic on the 
level of syndicated investments. The third paper focuses on the effects on the VC firm 
level, and finally, the fourth paper addresses the effect of the networks that are formed 
as a result of the syndication relationships. 
Figure 1 Levels of venture capital and research questions of the dissertation 
INVESTOR
(VC / LP)
INVESTMENT
(VENTURE / FUND)
INVESTOR
Paper 3: Does syndication increase
the optimal portfolio size of VCs?
Paper 2: How effective are profit distribution
structures in funds syndicated by 
private and public actors?
Paper 4: How do networks help
to mediate information
on investment targets
Paper 1: What do we know about
venture capital syndication?
NETWORK LEVEL
VC FIRM LEVEL
INVESTMENT LEVEL
INVESTOR
INVESTOR
INVESTOR
INVESTOR
INVESTOR
INVESTOR
(VC / LP)
Syndication
relationship
Syndicated investment
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3 KEY RESULTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
The contributions of the dissertation are targeted both to the literature on VC 
syndication and to the more generic literature on inter-organizational relationships. 
Primarily, the results of the dissertation contribute to two aspects of VC syndication 
literature. First, the results extend and complement the existing knowledge on the 
syndication of VC investments, that is, why and with what effects VC investments are 
syndicated. Second, the results extend the existing perspectives on VC syndication by 
introducing new variety to the literature with respect to investments, investors, and 
motives. In addition to these contributions to the VC syndication literature, I discuss 
below the two most prominent avenues for generalizing the results to contexts beyond 
venture capital. 
3.1 KEY RESULTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO SYNDICATION LITERATURE 
3.1.1 Syndication of VC Investments 
To illustrate the positioning and contributions of the papers within the literature on 
venture capital syndication, Table I presents a categorization of the extant literature with 
respect to the level of analysis. The categorization is based on the three levels of 
syndication – investment, firm, and network – corresponding to the research questions 
of the dissertation.  
The first of the studies (Appendix 1) contributes to the literature on venture capital 
syndication by reviewing the published research and selected working papers on the 
topic. To answer the research question of how well the existing knowledge is able to 
answer the questions of how, why, and under what circumstances syndication affects 
performance, the paper adopts two points of view through which the literature is 
reviewed and synthesized. First, I propose that viewing syndication from the functional 
and strategic perspectives helps distinguish the defining antecedents of syndication: 
VCs’ role as financial intermediaries and the strategic actions VCs undertake within 
their role. Second, I categorize the literature on the basis of the schematic structure of 
the syndication, that is, I divide the literature into three categories depending on whether 
it addresses: a) a syndication decision; b) the structuring of syndicates, or c) the 
outcomes of syndication. 
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Table I Levels of analysis in the existing body of knowledge regarding VC syndication 
Level of 
analysis Existing research 
Contributions of 
dissertation 
Reviews  Origins (Michie, 1981) 
Motivations (Lockett & Wright, 1999; Lockett et al., 2001; 
Manigart et al., 2006) 
VC strategy (De Clercq et al., Forthcoming) 
Paper 1: Review and 
synthesis of 
antecedents and 
outcomes of 
syndication 
Investment  Contracting  
Agency problems & Asymmetric information (Admati & 
Pfleiderer, 1994; Casamatta & Haritchabalet, 2007; Schmidt, 
2003), 
Commitment to liquidation (Huang & Xu, 2003) 
Security-type selection (Cumming, 2005) 
Governance & Involvement (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2003, , 2004) 
Paper 2: Structuring 
of profit distribution 
in fund investments 
among 
heterogeneous fund 
investors.  
 
Decisions, motives, & effects 
 
Syndication decision (Cumming, 2006a; Cumming, Fleming, & 
Schwienbacher, 2006; Dimov & Milanov, 2009; Lerner, 1994) 
Governance (Filatotchev, Chahine, Wright, & Arberk, 2005; 
Filatotchev, Wright, & Arberk, 2006) 
Target internationalization (Mäkelä & Maula, 2005) 
Performance (Birmingham, Busenitz, & Arthurs, 2003; Brander et 
al., 2002; Dimov & De Clercq, 2006; Fleming, 2004;  Giot et al., 
2007; Guler, 2007; Mason & Harrison, 2002) 
 
 
Firm Use and effects  
 
Use of syndication (De Clercq & Dimov, 2004) 
Effect on 
Involvement (Bottazzi, Da Rin, & Hellmann, 2008; De Clercq 
et al., 2008b; Elango, Fried, Hisrich, & Polonchek, 1995) 
 Deal flow generation (Jungwirth & Moog, 2004) 
 Portfolio size (Cumming, 2006b) 
 Performance (De Clercq et al., 2008a; Hill, Maula, 
Birkinshaw, & Murray, 2009) 
 
 
Paper 3: Effects of 
syndication on 
optimal portfolio size 
of VC firms 
Network Dyads and syndicates  
 Partner selection and formation (Hopp, 2008; Sorenson & Stuart, 
2008; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001; Trapido, 2007; Tykvová, 2007) 
Syndicate structure & composition (Cumming, Fleming, & 
Schwienbacher, 2005; Hellmann, 2002; Makela & Maula, 2008; 
Wright & Lockett, 2003) 
Commitment & group processes (Birmingham et al., 2003; 
Dimov et al., 2006; Ferrary, 2003; Guler, 2007; Makela & Maula, 
2006) 
Performance effects (De Clercq et al., 2008a; Giot et al., 2007) 
 
 
Structure & effects 
 
Network structure and formation (Bygrave, 1987, , 1988; Castilla, 
Hwang, Granovetter, & Granovetter, 2000; Fund, Pollock, Baker, 
& Wowak, 2008; Keil, Maula, & Wilson, Forthcoming; Kogut, 
Urso, & Walker, 2007) 
Information distribution (Podolny, 2001; Walker, 2008) 
Effects of social position (Dimov, Shepherd, & Sutcliffe, 2007) 
Performance effects (Abell & Nisar, 2007; Echols et al., 2005; 
Hochberg et al., 2007)  
Paper 4: Effects of 
VCs’ network 
contacts on exits 
from ventures 
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When the literature is approached from these two perspectives, it becomes evident that 
while research has devoted considerable attention to the syndication of venture capital 
investments, the focus of the earlier research has predominantly been on the investment-
level motives and outcomes. Accordingly, the literature on the strategic dimension of 
syndication is underdeveloped. That is, one of the main aspects of syndication that we 
do not know about is how the use of syndication relates to the overall strategy of VC 
firms, and whether this strategic dimension has consequences for the decisions and 
outcomes of syndication. On the basis of the synthesis, the paper proposes that future 
research should pay more attention to the strategies of VC firms, as well as seeking 
rationales for whether and how syndication creates performance differences among VC 
firms. 
Contributing to this gap regarding the performance effects, the third (Appendix 3) and 
fourth papers (Appendix 4) provide two mechanisms through which syndication may 
affect performance. The third paper examines longitudinal data on a sample of 94 
leading U.S. VC firms, addressing the research questions of whether there is an optimal 
portfolio size and how it is affected by syndication. The results indicate that VCs’ 
involvement in their ventures is valuable, and allocating their attention to too many 
portfolio companies has adverse effects on performance. However, syndication, 
especially syndication in the role of a non-lead investor, moderated this optimum 
positively. This suggests that syndication functions as an effective work-sharing 
mechanism. With respect to both the conclusions of the first paper and the performance 
effect addressed in the extant research, this result introduces a potential mechanism 
through which syndication may translate into a difference in performance between VC 
firms, namely, through leveraging existing resources with co-operation. This provides a 
novel contribution to the extant research. While earlier research has addressed the use of 
syndication on the firm level (De Clercq et al., 2004), as well as its effects on portfolio 
size (Cumming, 2006b) and performance (De Clercq et al., 2008a; Echols et al., 2005; 
Hill et al., 2009), the link between syndication, personnel resources, and performance 
has not been addressed. 
In a similar vein, the results of the fourth paper (Appendix 4), based on the analysis of 
data from 1431 European venture capital-backed ventures and their exits, suggest 
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another mechanism for performance effects. This paper examines the effect of direct 
and indirect ties to non-domestic markets on the probability of finding new investors 
from those markets when a VC exits from an investment. The paper suggests that the 
networks of venture capitalists function as conduits of information regarding investment 
targets. The results show that the more connected a portfolio company was to non-
domestic markets, the more likely an exit to these markets was. Additionally, direct and 
indirect ties were found to have differing effects regarding the mediated information. 
Direct ties provide a rich channel that both mediates information and supports its 
credibility, while indirect ties mediate simpler information, facilitating the recognition 
of investment targets. For VC firms and portfolio companies, this implies that those 
VCs with good connections to other markets may enjoy extended opportunities to exit 
from their investments, thus suggesting a source of enhanced performance. This 
complements the existing research on syndication networks by suggesting a network-
level mechanism for performance effects.  
3.1.2 Extending Perspectives on Syndication beyond Investments  
In addition to contributing to the understanding of the antecedents and outcomes of the 
syndication of venture capital investments, the dissertation contributes to the literature 
by extending the focus on syndication beyond ventures and homogenous VC firms. The 
second paper (Appendix 2) provides two extensions to the perspectives of the existing 
literature. First, it adopts a novel approach and addresses syndication at the fund level. 
Investigating the effects of profit distribution, the paper examines a situation in which 
limited partners, usually considered only as a passive source of financing for funds, 
jointly invest in a fund, effectively forming a syndicate. Second, it introduces a case 
where these syndication partners have differing goals for the investment, which creates 
a need to structure the profit distribution. While there exist a few studies examining 
hybrid syndicates in VC (Hellmann, 2002), loans (Dennis & Mullineaux, 2000), and 
investment banking (Song, 2004), the altered profit distribution stemming from the non-
profit-oriented goals of public investors introduces a new dimension to the literature. 
The results of the study suggest that while the profit distribution structures of VC funds 
can be organized to meet the interests of both parties, they are limited with respect to 
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their effectiveness in directing private sector actors to markets with significant 
opportunity costs.  
Together, the four studies of the dissertation contribute to the syndication literature by 
identifying the need to diversify perspectives on syndication and contribute to the 
understanding of different levels of syndication. In particular, the studies draw attention 
to the strategic perspective of syndication, that is, VC firm-level factors that affect the 
decision and outcomes of syndication. The first paper identifies this as one of the most 
prominent areas for further research, the third and fourth papers propose mechanisms 
for the effects of syndication and the second paper addresses the incorporation of 
differing strategic interests into the structure of syndicates. These views complement 
and support the existing research, which has addressed topics such as strategic 
positioning (Echols et al., 2005), the role of opportunities (Dimov et al., 2009), and the 
knowledge acquisition (De Clercq et al., 2008a) of VC firms. 
Furthermore, a contribution present in all the studies is the examination of 
heterogeneous syndication partners. The differentiation between public/private, 
lead/non-lead, and domestic/foreign syndication partners offers tools to explicate the 
formation, dynamics, and effects of syndicates. The extant research has predominantly 
addressed syndication among homogenous VCs within domestic markets. This has 
reduced the sources of differences among VCs to the differences in their experience and 
resources. Consequently, as is evident from the review of the first paper, little attention 
has been addressed to how the characteristics and interests of different types of 
investors might affect investment outcomes and dynamics. Accordingly, the three 
papers focusing on specific topics within syndicates contribute to the understanding of 
the effects of distinguishing the roles of public and private investors (Appendix 2), lead 
and non-lead investors (Appendix 3), and foreign and domestic investors (Appendix 4). 
Table II summarizes the main contributions of the papers with the research questions 
and design. 
   
  
Table II Summary of the research questions, research design, key results, and contributions of the papers  
 Paper 1 Paper 2 Paper 3 Paper 4 
Title Venture capital syndication: 
synthesis and future directions 
Profit distribution and 
compensation structures in 
publicly and privately funded 
hybrid venture capital funds 
Allocation of attention and 
performance of the venture 
capitalist 
Do networks of financial 
intermediaries help reduce local 
bias? Evidence from cross-border 
venture capital 
Key question 
about 
syndication 
What do we know about venture 
capital syndication? 
How can fund syndication 
between private and public actors 
be structured? 
Does syndication increase the 
optimal portfolio size of VCs? 
How do syndication networks 
affect exits from investments? 
Specific 
research 
question 
How well does the research 
answer the questions of how, why, 
and when syndication affects 
performance?  
What are the limits for hybrid 
fund structures to incentivize 
private investors? 
How does VC involvement in 
portfolio companies affect VC 
performance? 
How do inter-organizational 
networks mediate information on 
investment targets? 
Level of 
analysis 
All Investment VC firm Industry network 
Syndicate roles All Private-Public Lead - non-lead Domestic - Foreign 
Research 
design 
Literature review Stochastic simulation Empirical, quantitative , 
longitudinal 
Empirical, quantitative, cross-
sectional 
Data source --- --- VentureXpert,  
New Issues, and Mergers and 
Acquisitions databases 
Pratt’s Guides to Venture Capital  
Sources 
VentureXpert,  
New Issues, and Mergers and 
Acquisitions databases 
 
 
Key results and 
insights 
 
1. Extant research has focused on 
venture-level effects and motives 
of syndication; the VC firm level 
requires future research 
2. Syndication is not solely 
targeted for the benefit of 
portfolio companies 
3. Syndication may not have a 
direct performance effect, but 
serves as a moderating factor 
The usability of profit-sharing 
structures is limited to markets 
where the gap to returns from 
functioning market segments is 
modest  
Results confirm the value of VC 
involvement and suggest that 
syndication enhances performance 
through work-sharing 
1. Direct and indirect ties to non-
domestic markets increase the 
likelihood of attracting non-
domestic investors 
2. Preference for local investment 
is mitigated by social networks 
with geographical reach 
3. Facilitating the networking of 
VCs extends the size of potential 
exit markets 
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3.2 EXTENDING THE RESULTS TO OTHER CONTEXTS 
3.2.1 Contributions to the Literature on Investment Banking Syndicates 
While the dissertation focuses on syndication specifically in the context of venture 
capital, its results can also be extended to syndication in other sectors of financial 
intermediation. Syndicates are common in primary markets for securities, that is, in loan 
markets and debt and equity issues, and accordingly, research has paid attention to the 
drivers and effects of syndicates of investment and commercial banks. The single most 
prominent contribution of this dissertation that can be extended to these contexts is the 
view that emphasizes the strategic factors that affect the use and the outcomes of 
syndication. In broad terms, the approaches of research to syndication in investment 
banking can be characterized as either functional or structural. On one hand, the 
functional stream is the dominant approach of financially-oriented studies of 
syndication. Within this stream, the motives identified for syndication include concerns 
about information production (e.g. Corwin & Schultz, 2005; Pichler & Wilhelm, 2001) 
and its nature as public good (e.g. Anand & Galetovic, 2000; Barzel, Habib, & Johnsen, 
2006), and the effects of syndication on certification, service enhancement, client 
retention, market-making, and analyst coverage (Corwin et al., 2005; Song, 2004). On 
the other hand, the structural stream has used security issues and investment banking as 
an empirical context for sociologically motivated studies, focusing mainly on the 
structure of co-operation and resulting networks (e.g. Baum, Shipilov, & Rowley, 2003; 
Chung, Singh, & Lee, 2000; Jensen, 2003; Podolny, 1993; Shipilov & Li, 2008). 
While functional and structural aspects have significant explanatory force within both 
venture capital and other contexts of financial intermediation, these perspectives can be 
fruitfully complemented by the inclusion of a strategic aspect, i.e., considering 
syndication as the contingent response of heterogeneous actors to their respective 
contextual factors. That is, while investment and commercial banks are at the heart of 
financial intermediation, they are nevertheless diverse firms with strategic interests. It 
should be noted, however, that while VC and investment banking syndicates share the 
aspects of information production, joint decision making, and risk-sharing, the 
syndicates formed around securities offerings are significantly different from venture 
capital syndication. Most importantly, investment banking syndicates essentially focus 
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on short-term information and liquidity production and thus lack one of the defining 
issues of venture capital syndication, that is, long-term value creation. Nevertheless, 
while the two contexts differ in terms of specifics, strategic issues such as resource 
leverage and responses to inter-organizational positioning can be expected to enrich the 
research when also adopted for the research on investment banking syndicates. 
3.2.2 Contribution to the Literature on Inter-Organizational Relationships 
From a broad perspective, syndicates are a form of inter-firm co-operation, horizontal 
alliances among financial intermediaries organized around the provision or arrangement 
of financing for firms with a financial deficit. Accordingly, from this perspective, the 
question regarding the contributions of the dissertation is to what extent these results 
can be generalized to all inter-organizational relationships and what their contribution is 
within this abstracted context. 
Instead of directly generalizable results, the main contribution of the dissertation is the 
dissection of venture capital syndication that is conducted in the four studies. VC 
syndication has drawn increasing attention from research that aims to provide 
theoretical contributions, using venture capital as the empirical context. The pervasive 
co-operation and well-documented syndication relationships offer a rich context for 
examining both dyadic co-operation relationships and the networks that these dyads 
create. To illustrate the extant research, Table III provides a categorization of the studies 
that use syndication as an empirical context for generalized results, classified with 
respect to level of analysis. 
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Table III Extant research using syndication of VC investments as empirical context 
 Published research Current working papers 
Dyads Formation (Hopp, 2008; Meuleman, 
Wright, Manigart, & Lockett, 2009; 
Sorenson et al., 2008; Sorenson et al., 
2001; Trapido, 2007)  
Gift exchange (Ferrary, 2003) 
  Formation (Meuleman, Manigart, 
Lockett, & Wright, 2008; Piskorski & 
Anand, 2004) 
 
  
Network  Ego network formation (Fund et al., 
2008; Keil et al., Forthcoming) 
Industry network formation (Kogut et 
al., 2007) 
Composition (Castilla et al., 2000) 
Information on the network (Podolny, 
2001) 
Social position within network 
(Dimov et al., 2007) 
Performance effect (Hochberg et al., 
2007)(Abell et al., 2007; Echols et al., 
2005) 
Information distribution (Walker, 
2008) 
 Network as entry barriers (Hochberg, 
Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2006) 
Social position within network (Milanov 
& Shepherd, 2008) Information 
distribution (Jääskeläinen & Maula, 
2009) 
Technological discontinuity recognition 
(Maula, Keil, & Zahra, 2003) 
Performance effect (Bothner, Kang, & 
Lee, 2008; Bothner, Kim, & Lee, 2008; 
Jääskeläinen, Maula, & Pynnä, 2008) 
Investment valuation (Meuleman & 
Wright, 2006) 
 
 
The review and analysis of venture capital syndication on its multiple levels serves as a 
basis to assess both the usability of venture capital syndication as an empirical context 
and the validity of generalization from VC syndication to other instances of inter-
organizational relationships. The results of the dissertation, especially those of the 
review (Paper 1), suggest that care should be taken when generalizing the results from 
the VC syndicate as: 1) there are significant gaps in terms of understanding the 
antecedents, motives, and contingencies of syndication decisions and thus the basis on 
which the dyads and networks are formed, and, 2) the strong functional antecedent of 
syndication suggests that syndication is largely a response to information and agency 
concerns, which are perhaps defining characteristics in financial intermediation more 
than in other contexts.  
3.3 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS  
3.3.1 Implications for Public Policy 
The practical relevance of the results is targeted towards public policy and limited 
partners. The relevance of the dissertations to public policy stems from the 
understanding that the results provide in terms of the sources of performance effects and 
their implications for public policy. The foremost implication of the third paper 
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(Appendix 3) is that the attention of VCs is valuable to the portfolio companies. If they 
merely pick and choose investment targets, the outcomes of the portfolio companies 
would be independent and the observed U-shaped relationship would not exist. This 
contributes to the motivation to use private sector VCs to channel funds to market 
segments that are considered to require public intervention. Given the premise that the 
inclusion of private VCs enhances the effectiveness of such interventions, the second 
paper (Appendix 2) then examines how to engineer the profit distribution structures of 
the funds used for policy interventions in a way that attracts VCs and private LPs to 
participate. The results in the paper imply that while multiple structures have been used 
in such programs, their capability to enhance the incentives is moderate. To illustrate, in 
2004 the average internal rate of return for all European private equity and venture 
capital investments was 9.5%, while the corresponding figure for early-stage 
investments was 0.2%. In comparison, the most extreme enhancement to the returns of 
private LPs that the structures examined were able to produce was approximately 7 
percentage units. That is, none of the structures would have been effective in providing 
equal incentives for private investors to invest at an early stage, should their opportunity 
cost match the average returns of industry. 
An alternative approach to direct policy interventions is to facilitate the legal and 
institutional context for venture capital investing. From this perspective, the results of 
the fourth paper (Appendix 4) suggest that the cross-border co-operation of venture 
capitalists creates networks that may facilitate the expansion of exit opportunities. Non-
domestic exit opportunities are particularly relevant for small open economies such as 
Finland, Sweden, Israel, or Ireland. The functioning of the exit market and the 
opportunities to divest investments are vital for the venture capitalists’ ability to realize 
profits (Black et al., 1998; Sahlman, 1990). Consequently, limited opportunities for 
divestments translate to limited interest in venture capital investing in the first place, 
thus hindering investment in science and technology. In the light of our results, policies 
should target the creation of an investment environment that facilitates cross-border 
investments, as, in addition to the direct benefits of expertise and financing, the direct 
and indirect connections to foreign investors enhance exit opportunities and thereby the 
functioning of VC markets. 
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3.3.2 Implications for Institutional Investors, VC Firms, and Ventures 
In addition to public policy, the results of the dissertation have implications for 
institutional investors, VC firms, and portfolio companies. For each of these 
stakeholders, the performance implications are of interest. The effects of portfolio size 
and network contacts suggest that well-connected VCs with manageable portfolios 
enjoy enhanced performance. Accordingly, as both the LPs selecting funds to invest in 
and the ventures seeking financing are interested in the expected performance and 
contributions of the VC, our results suggest two criteria that can be used when 
comparing VCs. 
For ventures, the effects of portfolio size examined in the second paper suggest that 
entrepreneurs seeking financing should consider the limitations that their investors face. 
While the results provide evidence that venture capitalists add value to ventures beyond 
the capital they provide, the level of involvement a VC firm contributes to an individual 
portfolio company depends on the size of its portfolio. Those VC firms that have large 
portfolios relative to their capacity divide their attention between numerous 
investments, thus reducing the amount of involvement in individual ventures. This also 
highlights the notion that is present in the literature review of the first paper, that is, that 
the interests of VC firms are not perfectly aligned with those of their investors or 
portfolio companies. As VCs aim to maximize the performance of their portfolios as a 
whole, they are likely to contribute less attention to any individual portfolio company 
than what would maximize its performance. 
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4 LIMITATIONS 
The review of syndication (Appendix 1) identifies two limitations within existing 
research that also have consequences for the empirical studies of the dissertation. First, 
partly as a result of the quantitative approach that is dominant within VC syndication 
research and partly as a result of the broader gap in the research concerning the behavior 
of venture capitalists, the empirical studies of the dissertation treat the behavior and 
actions of VCs largely as a black box. This has two consequences. On one hand, in the 
second paper, (Appendix 2), regarding profit distribution structures, the examination of 
the effects of incentive structures is limited to the ex ante choice of VC firms to 
participate or not. As the paper uses a simulation approach to examine the effectiveness 
of the fund structures in creating incentives to private actors to participate, the behavior 
of VC firms has to be explicitly modeled. This modeling is limited to determining the 
rational and calculative choice between the structure examined and its opportunity cost, 
partly as a result of the technical constraints, and partly as a result of the lack of 
evidence and understanding of VC behavior. Therefore, the highly interesting question 
of what would happen if an initially attractive compensation structure later lost its 
appeal because of a market downturn lies outside the scope of this study. On the other 
hand, because of the same lack of understanding of VC firms’ behavior, the third and 
fourth paper (Appendix 3 and 4) are based on very plausible, but nevertheless assumed 
aspects of VC firms’ actions regarding the roles and interactions of VC firms in 
syndicates. In Paper 3, it is assumed that the role as lead investor correlates with the size 
of the investment, and the analysis in Paper 4 assumes that syndicates facilitate 
communication and information-sharing between participating VC firms. Accordingly, 
to verify the correctness of these assumptions and to provide further insights into the 
actions of VC firms in the management of their investments and their funds, more 
qualitatively oriented research on syndication is called for. 
The second source of limitations suggested by the review is the measurement of 
performance. Papers 3 and 4 use successful exits from investments, i.e., IPOs and 
acquisitions, as a measure for performance. While this approach is both widely used in 
the studies addressing the performance effects of syndication and highly reasonable as 
these exit methods generate the largest profits (e.g. Bygrave & Timmons, 1992; 
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Cochrane, 2005), it nevertheless limits both the details of the studies and the 
conclusions from the results. While participation in a successful exit is a plausible proxy 
for a successful investment, it lacks the power to analyze the distribution of profits 
between syndicate members, e.g. as a result of differences in the entry rounds of 
investors. This leaves open the question of whether some VC firms benefit more from 
syndication than others. This, in turn, limits the strength with which the two suggested 
performance mechanisms of syndication, work-sharing and information distribution, can 
be concluded to have a positive impact on the performance of VC firms. Thus, results 
are conditional on the role of the IPO and acquisitions in the profits of VCs and further 
research on the distribution of profits from investments is needed. 
In addition to the two limitations implied by the results of the literature review, a third 
source of limitations is the data used in the empirical studies, Papers 3 and 4. On one 
hand, to examine the effect of syndication on optimal portfolio size, the third paper uses 
data on the largest US VC firms, which may limit the generalizability of the results to 
smaller VC firms in smaller VC markets. On the other hand, Paper 4 examines the 
effect of VC syndication networks on the likelihood of non-domestic exits using data on 
European VC investments. Although the database used, VentureXpert, presents the 
most extensive source of data available on European VC investments, it only covers on 
average approximately 30-40% of the investments made by European VC firms. The 
bias is likely to be towards the larger investments of large VC firms, potentially limiting 
the generalizability of the results. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research has addressed venture capital syndication by synthesizing existing 
research and focusing on three specific syndication-related questions on the level of 
investments, VC firms, and networks. On the basis of an extensive review of the 
literature, the first paper drew attention to the lack of research on VC firm-level aspects 
of syndication. This led to the conclusion that there is a need for further research from 
the perspectives of VC firms and LPs in terms of performance effects, benefits, and 
strategies. Accordingly, the second paper investigated the limits of incorporating the 
interests of private and public LPs into hybrid funds, and the third and fourth papers 
examined two potential mechanisms for enhanced performance through syndication, 
work-sharing, and syndication networks. The second paper found that while hybrid 
funds with asymmetric profit distribution do incorporate the policy interest of public 
investors with a level of profit that satisfies private investors, their ability to target 
market segments with significantly lower return expectations is limited. The third found 
that syndication increases the number of portfolio companies VC firms are able to 
manage effectively, thus providing a mechanism to leverage VCs’ internal resources 
with co-operation. Finally, the fourth paper, investigating information mediation in 
syndication networks, found that the direct and indirect contacts of VCs distribute 
information across distances, and thereby increase the likelihood of finding foreign exit 
routes from the investments. 
Although the potential directions for future research are abundant, there are two themes 
that appear as the most significant. First, while each of the individual studies suggests 
approaches for deepening the understanding of their respective areas, a common theme 
present in each of them is the need to deepen the knowledge on the strategic interests 
incorporated in syndication. Specifically, the main direction suggested for future 
research in the first paper is the need to understand syndication as an aspect of VC 
firms’ overall strategy. For the second paper, this theme is present in the need to expand 
the literature in future by considering how the post-investment goals of actors affect the 
outcomes of hybrid funds. The third and fourth papers, then, open up directions for 
future research by showing how two aspects of syndication can enhance performance. 
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The question here is that, given the benefits, what is the room for VC firms to optimize 
their performance by intentionally structuring their operations and networks? 
The second theme strongly present in all the four studies is the heterogeneity of 
syndicate partners. While complementary assets have been found to form one of the 
dominant drivers for the motivations and benefits of inter-organizational relationships in 
general (Ahuja, 2000; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Lavie, 2007; Stuart, 2000), the 
syndication literature has directed only limited attention to the heterogeneity of 
syndicate partners. In addition to the studies presented in this dissertation, Mäkelä and 
Maula (2008; 2005) consider the benefits of cross-border syndication, and Hellman 
addresses syndicates with banks and corporate investors (2002; Hellmann, Lindsey, & 
Puri, 2008). In addition to this apparent level of heterogeneity (e.g. public/private, 
bank/VC), there is a need for further research with respect to the resource heterogeneity 
of otherwise apparently homogeneous VCs. So far, aspects such as experience and 
specialized expertise have received modest attention (e.g. De Clercq et al., 2004; Du, 
2008), but the interplay between the complementary resources of syndicate partners 
lacks contributions. This lack of research has partly contributed to the fact that current 
research presents no evidence for whether and how the composition of syndicates 
affects syndicated investments. Therefore, more research is needed in terms of what 
different types of investors bring to syndicates, how these complementary assets 
interact, and what their effects on the investments are. 
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